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Abstract
Previous work has shown that the information value of requests
can be manipulated by controlling the sparsity of hypotheses,
the degree to which category members are rare or common in
the domain under consideration when making those requests.
However, the degree to which people are sensitive to expected
information value is unknown. This study examined a binary
sorting task where sparsity differed across conditions. In con-
trast to previous work using hypotheses representable as visual
areas, the stimuli in this study defined hypotheses in an abstract
similarity space over geometric shapes. Participants could
request labels for either category members or non-members.
While both request types were used in all conditions, most of-
ten evenly, the proportion of participants showing a preference
for one type of request was strongly impacted by the informa-
tion value of that request type. A small tendency to prefer re-
quests from the designated target category was also observed.
Keywords: hypothesis testing; positive test bias; sparsity; in-
formation sensitivity;
Introduction
Very few people ever become professional chicken-sexers,
but most of us can identify with the kind of problem they
face. Collections of ambiguous targets that need to be catego-
rized are common. Opal miners, worlds away from poultry-
breeding, face a similar problem sorting through piles of
nearly identical rocks for the few that, if polished, may reveal
a gemstone shine. Consider the problem faced by a novice in
each of these fields trying to become expert via training exam-
ples from some authoritative test, perhaps an expert teacher.
What kinds of examples should they seek in order to become
an expert themselves as quickly as possible? At first glance,
different problem domains require different strategies. A nat-
ural strategy for the chicken-sexer might be to request an even
number of examples of both male and female chicks. The
beginner opal miner on the other hand, is probably only in-
terested in seeing examples of opals in the raw. The central
claim of this paper is that these differing tendencies can be
described under the same normative framework, and reflect a
rational sensitivity to features of the problem domain: in this
case that chicks of either sex are nearly equally likely, while
opals are rare among rocks.
Since they are tasks that involve some learner control over
what information will be received, novice opal mining and
chicken sexing can be considered examples of active learning
(Settles, 2009; Gureckis & Markant, 2012). The psycholog-
ical literature has considered a number of different norma-
tive standards against which human behavior in such tasks
can be assessed (Nelson, 2005). The traditional approach
comes from the philosophy of science and treats falsifica-
tionism as the normative standard. According to this view,
learners should conduct tests designed to falsify their current
hypothesis, on the grounds that confirming evidence is always
open to alternative explanations, but counterexamples always
definitively rule out a hypothesis (Popper, 1959). Strict fal-
sification is rarely followed by people faced with hypothesis-
testing tasks (Wason, 1960, 1968). Instead, a tendency to
propose tests consistent with a working hypothesis has been
replicated in a wide range of tasks and contexts (Nickerson,
1998).
Although originally considered to be an irrational bias,
people’s tendency to seek positive tests may have a solid
statistical basis. Tests consistent with a currently preferred
candidate hypothesis can falsify the hypothesis in situations
where the true hypothesis is not a superset of the candidate
one (Klayman & Ha, 1987). In choosing whether to probe
from within the scope of a candidate hypothesis or outside
it, the learner must consider the base rate probability that a
member of the domain under consideration is also a mem-
ber of the target set, the proportion of domain members that
are covered by the candidate hypothesis, and (estimated) pos-
itive and negative error rates under the candidate hypothesis
(Klayman & Ha, 1987). When the target set is a relatively
small subset of the whole domain, and its size is approxi-
mately known, positive testing can maximize the chance of
falsification.
Expanding on the work of Klayman and Ha (1987), recent
studies have tended to assess the quality of a particular query
in statistical terms. A good query might be one that min-
imizes the expected probability of error on a randomly se-
lected domain member after the seeing the results of the test
(expected probability gain), or returns the most information
about the identity of the true hypothesis (expected informa-
tion gain). Although differing in their predictions under some
circumstances, these measures share the idea that a hypothe-
sis test is a kind of gamble with uncertain rewards in terms of
evidential value (Poletiek & Berndsen, 2000). Unlike strict
falsification, a strategy of maximizing expected probability
gain has been shown to account well for human responses in
simplified hypothesis testing tasks (Nelson, McKenzie, Cot-
trell, & Sejnowski, 2010).
This recent line of work opens up an important question:
does people’s preference for positive evidence genuinely re-
flect a sensitivity to its informational value, or is it a cognitive
bias that just happens to produce good results in some tasks?
It is this question that we consider in this paper.
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Hypothesis sparsity and information search
Theoretical results showing the value of positive evidence
do not imply that the positive test strategy is universally the
best approach (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Austerweil & Griffiths,
2011; Navarro & Perfors, 2011). Rather, they imply that it
works when the possible hypotheses are sparse. If hypothe-
ses are thought of as indicating meaningful subsets of some
larger domain, the sparsity of a hypothesis refers to the pro-
portion of all members of a domain that are selected. Sparse
hypotheses include fewer than half of the members of the rel-
evant domain (Navarro & Perfors, 2011). For example, in the
domain LIVING SPECIES the category DOGS is sparse, while
AEROBIC ORGANISM is a not sparse, since most living things
are not dogs, but do metabolise oxygen. Sparsity can vary in
degree: while DOGS and POODLES are both sparse categories
in the domain of living things, the category POODLES is more
sparse. Arbitrarily complex hypotheses can still be described
in terms of a set of members, for example when describing a
linguistic hypothesis in terms of the set of sentences the hy-
pothesis considers grammatical.
Sparsity is one factor impacting the utility of the posi-
tive test strategy (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Navarro & Perfors,
2011). Where the target hypothesis is sparse, the expected
information value of negative tests is reduced. As figure 1
shows, in this case the probability of a negative test produc-
ing a disconfirming positive result is low, regardless of the
accuracy of the learner’s working hypothesis. Conversely, if
the target hypothesis is not sparse, the value of positive testing
falls, because most positive tests return an expected and there-
fore uninformative positive result. This yields a natural pre-
diction: manipulating the sparsity of the learner’s hypotheses
should impact the degree to which the learner favours positive
tests. If the hypotheses considered are not sparse, an optimal
learner should show a negative test bias.
There is evidence suggesting this pattern is observed em-
pirically. For instance, Hendrickson, Navarro, and Perfors
(in preparation) had participants play a modified version of
the game “battleships”. Hypotheses corresponded to a pos-
sible configuration of ships, each of which covered an area
in a two dimensional space. The size of the ships was var-
ied across experimental conditions, changing the sparsity of
hypotheses. The predicted effect was observed: when hy-
potheses were not sparse, people shifted away from positive
tests and towards negative ones.
One potential problem with this result is that the task was
highly visual rather than conceptual in nature. In this case,
the coverage of the possible domain by a given hypothesis
was also literally the coverage of a 2D field. It is possible that
the estimation of relative likelihoods apparently considered
by participants was driven by an estimate of relative area par-
ticular to the visual system. In order to generalize to other ac-
tive learning tasks, it must be established that the idea of cov-
erage in a domain extends from literal physical spaces to ab-
stract conceptual spaces. It is also possible that the extra dif-
ficulty associated with such abstract spaces makes reliance on
Figure 1: A toy world showing the information value of positive and
negative requests with a sparse category. Objects in this world vary
on two features, x and y, and some representative plausible category
boundaries are drawn in grey. In the first panel, the learner has a
single example outside the target category. This example is uninfor-
mative as it is consistent with many category structures. In contrast,
the second panel shows a learner who has a single example of a cate-
gory member. A large number of the hypotheses in the first panel are
ruled out, leaving only those which include the observed example.
The third panel shows the critical properties of the world generating
the examples for these learners: the target category is in fact small
and coherent. If it were not, the advantages of positive testing would
be reduced or even reversed (Navarro & Perfors, 2011).
simple heuristics such as a positive testing bias more attrac-
tive (Cherubini, Rusconi, Russo, Di Bari, & Sacchi, 2010).
The current study aims to extend the results in Hendrickson
et al. (in preparation), to see if the same effect can be observed
with stimuli drawn from a more abstract stimulus space. The
experiment took the form of a sorting task asking partici-
pants to learn a category boundary in a stimulus space con-
sisting of simple geometric shapes varying on three feature-
dimensions, described below. Participants were able to re-
quest labels for a randomly selected positive example of the
target category or a negative non-target example. People were
aware of what proportion of all stimuli belonged to the target
category, and between-subjects manipulations of this propor-
tion showed both a sensitivity to the information value of each




367 adults were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Of
these, 301 completed the task, and 121 were excluded from
further analysis for either failing to make any label requests
at all (85 participants), making more than 60 requests (nine
participants), or failing to sort labelled examples into the cat-
egory indicated by the label, revealing a lack of effort or a
misunderstanding of the task (36 participants). Nine partici-
pants were excluded for a combination of these reasons.The
remaining 180 participants completed one practice run and
two real runs of the sorting task, with between 104 and 131
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completed sorts recorded in each of three sparsity condi-
tions. These conditions set the proportion of stimuli belong-
ing to the target category at 25% SPARSE, 50% EVEN, or
75% NON-SPARSE. Note that the only difference between
the SPARSE and NON-SPARSE conditions is one of framing,
while both differ from the even condition in terms of the rel-
ative information value of requests.
Ages ranged from 19 to 67 (mean: 34.4) and 45.0% were
female. 117 of the final participants were from the United
States and 52 were from India. Those remaining were from
eight other countries in Africa, North and South America, Eu-
rope, and Asia. All participants were paid $0.60US for the 15
minute experiment.
Procedure
The cover story for the study described a fictitious company
interested in harvesting a new substance called selenoid from
plankton. Participants were told selenoid-rich plankton were
desirable for harvesting, and were given the percentage of
all plankton expected to be selenoid-rich, either 25%, 50%,
or 75% depending on the experimental condition. In each
trial, people were presented with two bins, each containing
a random selection of half the possible plankton examples,
as shown in figure 2. Buttons below each bin allowed partici-
pants to request a label for either a selenoid-rich or a selenoid-
poor plankton, which appeared as a persistent colored high-
light around a randomly selected example of the requested
type after a two-second delay. Plankton could be swapped be-
tween bins by clicking on them, and participants were asked
to click a submit button after they had sorted each plankton
into the correct bin.
Once a sort was submitted, the true selenoid status for each
plankton was revealed and a score displayed, calculated as
10 points for each plankton correctly sorted and -10 for each
incorrectly sorted. An inference-efficiency score defined as
total score divided by number of requests made was also dis-
played. The maximum score under this scheme was 640. The
expected score due to chance was zero in the EVEN condition
and 160 in the SPARSE and NON-SPARSE conditions.
The experiment began with all participants answering a se-
ries of multiple-choice questions to make sure they had read
and understood the instructions. The main task was then pre-
sented three times, the first of which was labelled as a prac-
tice trial and required participants to try all the available ac-
tions and submit a sort that respected the known proportion
of plankton in each category and any visible labels. Data
from this trial was not analysed. Stimuli were colored ei-
ther red, blue, or green (order randomized) across the three
trials to emphasise their distinctness, with color variation be-
tween stimuli within a single trial based on four evenly spaced
points on the 255-value RGB scale for that color.
Stimuli
The stimuli were geometric shapes consisting of a ring and a
number of radial arms. They varied in color intensity, size of
Figure 2: Presentation of the sorting task. Information available at
all times included all possible plankton examples, the proportion of
plankton belonging to each group, and the request types available.
Labels, if requested, appeared as a persistent colored border around
a randomly selected example of the appropriate type. An initial con-
figuration is shown here, but two requests have been made, one of
each type.
Figure 3: 64 different stimuli were used, corresponding to all unique
combinations of four possible values on three dimensions. These
were color, ring size, and number of arms, shown here increasing
from left to right.
the ring, and number of arms, with four levels in each dimen-
sion giving 64 combinations of feature values.
The true selenoid status of the plankton in a given trial was
determined by a threshold rule on one dimension of varia-
tion, randomly selected under the constraint that rules could
not repeat across the three trials presented to any one par-
ticipant. The location of this threshold was determined by
sparsity condition, which varied between participants. In the
SPARSE and NON-SPARSE conditions, members of the minor-
ity group shared one extreme value on one type of feature.
In the EVEN condition, members of the same group shared
one of two adjacent values in the discriminating feature. For
example, a participant in the SPARSE condition might view a
practice trial using red plankton in which selenoid-rich plank-
ton had four arms and selenoid-poor plankton one, two or
three, then view a trial using blue plankton where only plank-
ton with the largest circles were rich, and finally a trial using
green plankton where only the darkest shade of green were
rich. Although repetition of another rule using number of
arms could not have been presented to this participant after
the first trial, the order of rules and whether the thresholds
were high or low were completely randomized.
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Figure 4: The modal score in all conditions was near perfect perfor-
mance, although many participants sorted with chance performance,
shown as peaks in the histogram at zero in the EVEN condition and
160 in the SPARSE and NON-SPARSE conditions
Results
The comparisons of interest between conditions required that
participants be engaged with the task. The average score
across participants was 368 of a maximum 640, correspond-
ing to 50.4 of 64 plankton correctly sorted.As figure 4 shows,
score distributions were bimodal in each condition, with one
peak at the expected score due to chance (zero for EVEN and
160 for SPARSE and NON-SPARSE) and the other peak at per-
fect performance.
While 27% of trials scored at or below chance, many peo-
ple were highly successful: on 18% of all trials, people re-
quired fewer than six labels to sort at least 93% correctly.
The mean number of swapping actions (36.0) was close to
the expected required number of swaps to correct a random
sort to an ordered one (32), indicating that participants meet-
ing the inclusion criteria above understood and engaged with
the task. Scores and number of label requests were not sig-
nificantly different across the first and second non-practice
trials (two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, D= .0487, and
D= .0339 respectively, p> .98).
Where positive testing bias predicts a preference for re-
quests labelling the selenoid-rich plankton category regard-
less of the population proportions, sensitivity to the informa-
tion value of requests implies a preference for requesting la-
bels from the minority classification if this is possible. We
distinguish among these hypotheses by comparing the pro-
portion of positive requests in each trial across conditions.
As figure 5 shows, the proportion of positive requests
differed across sparsity conditions (F(2,359) = 9.581, p <
0.001). A post-hoc Tukey Test showed that the proportion of
positive requests was significantly higher in the SPARSE than
NON-SPARSE and in EVEN than NON-SPARSE. Potential nui-
sance variables trial color, trial number, and left/right order of
presentation were not found to have a significant effect (did
Figure 5: Proportion of positive requests appear to cluster at values
zero, 0.5, and one. Means and 95% confidence intervals are plotted
as dark and light horizontal lines respectively. The observed differ-
ences between means may be driven by participants preferentially
choosing between a small number of distinct request strategies.
not improve model AIC).
As Figure 5 shows, the differences in means do not appear
to reflect a large-scale shift in requests for all individuals from
condition to condition. Rather, in all conditions, responses
tended to cluster at the values of one (all positive), zero (all
negative), and 0.5 (even). The proportion of people choos-
ing each strategy is what appears to shift between conditions.
We can test whether this is truly occurring by categorizing
responses by request strategy, as in Figure 6. A participant
was classified as using an Even request strategy if their pro-
portion of positive requests fell between 0.45 and 0.55, with
Prefers positive and Prefers negative responses falling above
and below these values.
All strategies were followed by some participants in
all conditions, but the proportion of participants selecting
each strategy differed significantly between conditions (χ22 =
13.16, p < .01). The Even request strategy balancing posi-
tive and negative requests was always most popular, although
the proportion of people preferring positive tests was higher
in the SPARSE condition than in the NON-SPARSE condition.
The inverse pattern was observed for negative tests, indicat-
ing a preference for whichever type of test corresponded to
the minority classification in the whole population. Such a
preference is consistent with the greater information value of
minority requests. As Figure 6 shows, this preference is ev-
ident even when the minority group is framed as a negative
non-target group.
Since the only difference between the SPARSE and NON-
SPARSE conditions is one of framing, if request choice is
driven by expected information gain, request preferences
should be simply reversed between these two conditions.
However, figure 6 shows a slight asymmetry whereby posi-
tive preferential strategies are more often chosen. Collapsing
across conditions, 0.48 of all information requests recorded
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Figure 6: Proportion of participants using each testing strategy in
the three conditions. Requesting equal amounts of information from
both possible categorizations was popular in all conditions, however
when population proportions were unequal, a greater proportion of
participants began to prefer requests from the minority group. This
preference was somewhat asymmetrical, with people more readily
switching to preferring positive requests
in this study were for selenoid-poor labels (1192 of 2482 to-
tal requests), and 0.52 were for selenoid-rich labels (1290
of 2482 total requests), a small but significant difference in
favour of positive requests despite the symmetry of the task
structure (χ21 = 7.74, p< .01).
To examine whether people’s apparent sensitivity to spar-
sity was in fact driven by a subset of participants, we par-
titioned trials by score into high-scoring (score over 600,
n=117), and lower-scoring trials (score less than or equal to
600, n=245). As figure 7 illustrates, both high-scoring tri-
als and low-scoring trials showed the same clustering pat-
tern at zero, 0.5, and one, with 0.5 the most popular strategy.
Also the tendency to switch to preferring labels of the mi-
nority categorization is significant only in the higher scoring
group (high scoring: F(2,114)= 13.04, p< .01, low scoring:
F(2,242) = 1.63, p> .1).
Discussion
The results show that people adjust their sampling strategies
in response to the sparsity of the hypothesis testing task at
hand, supporting an information sensitive account of natural
hypothesis testing (Navarro & Perfors, 2011). This sensitiv-
ity to the relative size of the target category in the stimulus
space obtains even though it is an abstract space defined over
the similarity of a set of geometrical shapes. The observed
behavior is inconsistent with a strong bias towards positive
testing, which predicts a difference between the symmetrical
SPARSE and NON-SPARSE conditions due to the change of
frame. No strong difference was observed, although positive
tests were more popular than negative tests overall.
Individual participants tended to use either balanced re-
quests or requests of a single type, but the popularity of these
Figure 7: Differences in mean proportion positive requests signifi-
cant in the higher scoring group, and not significant, although in the
same direction, in the lower scoring group.
strategies varied across conditions. The Even strategy was al-
ways most popular. This may reflect a popular explorative
heuristic that motivates people to use all available request
types, or possibly simply a lack of engagement with the task.
This second alternative is somewhat supported by the obser-
vation that preferential strategies were used more among the
highest scoring participants. Despite the overall popularity
of the Even strategy, the attractiveness of preferential strate-
gies scaled as predicted with changes in the true information
value of requests. For this to be the case, the value of requests
must have been estimated (not necessarily explicitly) by par-
ticipants from information available about category sparsity.
Such information is often available as domain knowledge in
real-world category learning tasks, as it is in the opal mining
and chicken sexing problems. It can also be estimated, even
when the universe of all possible examples is large, for ex-
ample by estimating a base rate probability from an observed
frequency or through capture-recapture estimation techniques
(also not necessarily explicit) when repeatedly encountering
novel and familiar examples of a category.
The behavior observed in the context of the plankton-
sorting task suggests that to the extent that category spar-
sity information is available, it could be expected to impact
the perceived attractiveness of different types of information
request, positive or negative. That said, although consistent
with a degree of sensitivity to the information value of re-
quests, these data show a number of ways in which people’s
requests deviate from information-sensitive treatments of the
task.
Participant showed some positive test bias, favouring the
target rich category asymmetrically despite the symmetry of
the sparsity manipulation. It is unclear if this is due to a form
of matching (Evans, 1998) on the target most prominent in the
instructions, or an expectation that the conditions that favour
positive testing are generally ubiquitous, although in this ar-
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tificial case they are not.
The clustering of positive-test proportions at zero, 0.5, and
one in all conditions also suggests a kind of heuristic ap-
proach, albeit a heuristic that is to some extent context sen-
sitive. It is unclear from these results if this clustering is re-
flective of granularity in the perception of information utility,
granularity in responding after accurate perception of infor-
mation utility, or simply an artifact of the fact that partici-
pants were limited to two different request types, which to
some extent naturally emphasises these values, especially for
small numbers of requests.
A number of features of the presentation are also open to
question. All possible plankton shapes were visible to partici-
pants at all times, a situation unlikely with natural categories,
but one which might influence the use of sparsity informa-
tion, since estimating the proportion of stimuli indexed by
a hypothesis in a given domain requires an estimate of the
boundaries of that domain. Similarly, the density of exam-
ples was even across the stimulus space, with one example
of each kind of plankton, a condition which need not hold in
general. The true category rules were also highly restricted,
in that they were all thresholds on a single dimension, bi-
nary, and strictly complementary. Natural categories are of-
ten non-binary, nested or otherwise overlapping, and often
involve multiple dimensions.
Further work is required to explore how people weigh up
the value of information-seeking actions under these more
complex conditions. The results presented here suggest that
some such consideration of information utility is an essential
component of any complete description of natural active con-
cept learning. Where hypothesis sparsity information is avail-
able, as it is in many natural domains, people’s information-
seeking behavior is informed by the structure of the domain,
even when that structure is abstract and conceptual in nature.
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